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thinking about singapore’s future(s)
Those working in the field of strategic foresight will 
readily tell you, even if in hushed whispers, that they do 
not have it easy. It was difficult enough in the early days 
of defining the field after the Second World War, and it 
has certainly gotten more challenging in recent years 
when those working in “futures”—analysts, strategists, 
forecasters, futurists, call them what you will—were seen 
to have failed spectacularly in predicting any number of 
catastrophic social, economic and political events. Again, 
take your pick: the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, 9/11, the 
US sub-prime mortgage crisis, various pandemics, the 
Great Recession, and the Eurozone debt crises.1
Clearly, the foresight enterprise is fraught with many 
difficulties. Ought we then to be doing it at all? The fact 
of the matter is that we, as a human species, cannot not 
think about the future (although different people will 
think about the future in varying degrees and ability).  As 
Wendell Bell puts it:
In every known society, people have conceptions 
of time and the future, even though some of 
their conceptions appear diverse, with different 
emphases on past and future and different degrees 
of elaboration and detail.2 
To the extent that we are aware that actions have conse-
quences (intended or otherwise), we already impli- 
citly consider the future. The rationale for the Singapore 
government’s strategic foresight enterprise is based on 
the argument articulated above – the future is inextricably 
linked to present action.
While most of the methods and tools – chief of which 
being “scenario planning” based on the Royal Dutch 
Shell’s own practice – were developed in the 1980s, the 
philosophical justification for developing Singapore’s 
strategic foresight capability can be traced to a 1979 
speech, titled Singapore into the 21st Century, by the 
then Minister for Foreign Affairs, S. Rajaratnam. With 
typical elegance and persuasiveness, Rajaratnam argued 
that futures thinking is integral to Singapore’s long-term 
prospects:
There are practical men who maintain that such 
speculations are a waste of time and they have no 
bearing at all on solutions to immediate day-to-day 
problems. This may have been so in earlier periods 
of history when changes were few and minute and 
the last three decades have seen the singapore 
government’s strategic foresight enterprise shift from 
the area of defence and security to the socio-aspirational 
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were spread over decades and centuries...[Because] 
we are not only living in a world of accelerating 
changes but also of changes which are global in 
scope and which permeate almost all aspects of 
human activity...[and since] change is about the 
future then only a future-oriented society can cope 
with the problems of the 21st century.3 
There in 1979 lay the philosophical (but overlooked) 
foundations of Singapore’s foresight enterprise.4 
 
What is of interest is not so much why the strategic 
foresight enterprise had found, and certainly continues 
to find, such traction in the Singapore government, but 
rather how it has evolved over time. This evolution can 
best be understood in two ways. The first is an ontologi-
cal shift in focus, expanding beyond defence and security 
to include issues in the socio-aspirational space, such 
as quality of life, definitions of success, national myths, 
questions of identity and so forth. The second is an episte-
mological shift in approach, expanding from a largely 
positivist worldview (that is, taking the world as given) to 
a more eclectic and normative perspective that views the 
world in terms of how it can be shaped.
the ontological shift: from security to the social, 
from threats to aspirations
The ontological shift in Singapore’s strategic foresight 
enterprise can best be understood in the actual shifts 
in both the physical and organisational locations of the 
foresight apparatus.
The initial conceptualisation and eventual development 
of scenario planning occurred within the Ministry of 
Defence in the 1980s, as the brainchild of then Deputy 
Secretary Peter Ho:
Singapore’s efforts at [ formal] futures planning 
began as an experiment in the Ministry of Defence 
(MINDEF), in the late 1980s... Scenario studies 
were carried out in the Scenario Planning Branch, 
with security as their primary concern.5
In that regard, the genesis of Singapore’s foresight enter-
prise is no different from how various think tanks and 
foresight agencies also had their origins in the defence 
and security domain. Indeed, the most famous think 
tank of all, RAND (an acronym standing prosaically for 
Research ANd Development), started life in late 1945 as a 
collaboration between the Douglas Aircraft Company and 
the Army Air Corps, drawing together the various opera-
tions researchers and war managers from the Second 
World War.6
The Scenario Planning Branch within MINDEF was 
envisaged to augment the ministry’s strategic, acquisi-
tion and budgetary planning cycle which typically took 
a long-term perspective of 10 to 15 years. Again, this 
mirrored RAND’s early work for the US Department 
of Defense which took the form of “policy alternatives, 
evaluations, designs, theories, suggestions, warnings, 
long range plans, statistics, predictions, descriptions of 
techniques, tests, analyses or, simply, new ideas.”7
The decision in 1991 for the scenario planning tool and 
techniques to be adopted in the broader government 
beyond MINDEF signalled two important shifts. First, 
there was a belief that other ministries and agencies 
could greatly augment their own futures thinking through 
these systematic techniques and formal tools. It would, 
of course, be naive to conclude that, prior to “scenario 
planning,” Singapore’s policy-makers went about their 
work without what Rajaratnam called the “future-
oriented” perspective. After all, as has been pointed 
out by many commentators, planning is an integral and 
inseparable element of Singapore’s policy-making DNA, 
brought particularly into sharp relief by a sense of acute 
vulnerability (in both geopolitical and economic terms).8
However, the formalisation of the foresight enter-
prise throughout the establishment signalled strongly 
the primacy of strategic foresight in underpinning all 
manner of policies.
The diffusion of futures thinking throughout the broader 
establishment, and of scenario planning in particular, was 
also accompanied by a significant reorganisation of the 
strategic foresight policy apparatus: chiefly, the creation 
of the Scenario Planning Office (SPO) within the Prime 
Minister’s Office (PMO) in 1995 under the guidance of the 
then Permanent Secretary in the PMO, Lim Siong Guan.9 
This new entity, in a sense, “owned” the scenario planning 
process for the government, and given its vantage point 
in the overarching PMO, it was almost inevitable that 
its focus – the ontological bedrock of its futures work – 
would move beyond the “hard-core” traditional defence 
and security issues to incorporate the “softer” issues 
future of the social sector
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in the socio-cultural domain: demographic changes, 
social resilience, the politics of identity (or identities), 
housing, education, and so forth.
The inaugural National Scenarios, widely regarded as 
SPO’s flagship product, were rolled out in 1997, and 
the two principal scenarios reflected and cemented the 
ontological shift beyond the security domain to incor-
porate the myriad complexities of the social, cultural 
and political dimensions.10 Still considered the most 
memorable and influential set of scenarios, the 1997 
iteration (which had a 20-year perspective) postulated two 
possible futures: “Hotel Singapore” on the one hand, in 
which the economic imperative will reign supreme and 
where the price of commercial success and global cosmo-
politanism was paid in terms of increased atomism and 
a sense of anomie and dislocation. The second scenario, 
“A Home Divided,” painted a future in which the singular 
national narrative would splinter, giving way to a plethora 
of irreconcilable stories that are centred on different 
loci of identities—ethnic, religious, special interests, 
ideology, all of which potentially challenging the national 
identity.
Given the social, economic and political developments 
of the last five years, the 1997 scenarios turned out to 
be extremely prescient. The process of generating the 
scenarios also turned out to be as instructive as the 
outcome, if not more so:
In the course of working on these scenarios, we 
discovered that while geopolitical and economic 
issues were well on the decision-makers’ radar 
screens, softer “social” issues like national 
identity, rootedness to Singapore and community 
ties received less attention.11
That aspirational and identity issues unexpectedly came to 
the fore in the course of researching and interviewing for 
the 1997 scenarios completed the shift not only in terms 
of focus but more crucially in the underlying ontological 
assumptions: from security threats assumed to be ontologi-
cally objective, to social hopes and fears which are inter-
subjectively constituted but experienced as no less than 
“real.” In 2003, the Scenario Planning Office was renamed 
the Strategic Policy Office, an acknowledgement of the 
increasingly holistic, complex and subjective manner in 
which Singapore’s future(s) was being defined.
In a sense, we have come full circle, albeit having done 
things back-to-front. Singapore’s strategic foresight 
enterprise had its roots in the military-security milieu, 
grappling with the question of “How do we secure 
‘us’?” It is only belatedly that we have begun to address 
the more fundamental question of “Who is ‘us’?” And 
yet Bell reminds us that, fundamentally, members of 
collectivities—societies, organisations, and nations—
find meaning and purpose in their charter or founding 
myths, where such myths form the basis for their societal 
identity and values. He further argues that the “charter 
myths of a particular group or society [is] a standard by 
which to evaluate the desirability of alternative images of 
the future...”12
Fast forward to the present from the 1997 scenarios, and 
there is an irony in realising that charting the way(s) 
ahead for Singapore rests on revisiting our charter myths. 
The “Our Singapore Conversation” (OSC), a nation-wide 
“town hall meeting,” was launched by Prime Minister Lee 
Hsien Loong at the 2012 National Day Rally to get people 
to articulate their “desirable futures” for Singapore.13 In 
one sense, therefore, the OSC can be seen as an exercise 
in strategic foresight.
To a large extent, the OSC has turned out to be an attempt 
to address “where we are going” by way of “who we are 
and where we come from.” This is clearly demonstrat-
ed in how participants reminisced about the “kampong 
spirit” (real or imagined) of yesteryear:
The road to the future appears to run through the past.
[N]obody appears to really care for one 
another’s well-being as well. There is 
a loss of kampong spirit, that sense of 
neighbourliness.14
I pray that our country will be more 
caring towards the old and have the 
kampong spirit to help each other.
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the epistemological shift: from uncovering 
futures to shaping them
In articulating what might be termed the French school 
of strategic foresight, la prospective, Hughes de Jouvenel 
argues:
As neither prophesy nor prediction, la prospective 
( foresight) does not aim to predict the future—to 
unveil it as if it were pre-fabricated—but to help 
us to build it. It invites us to consider the future 
as something that we create or build, rather than 
something already decided, like a mystery that 
simply needs to be unravelled.15
De Jouvenel provides a useful analytical point of departure 
to understand the changing epistemology of the strategic 
foresight enterprise in Singapore. Because the fact of the 
matter is that, despite many protestations to the contrary, 
strategic foresight, in many places and at various times, 
has almost always begun as if it were prophesy and predic-
tion, where the sole purpose of the exercise was to “unveil 
a pre-fabricated future”. Singapore has been no exception.
Given the importance of the national defence impera-
tive, the language of military strategy and operations 
lends itself naturally to explaining how futures work 
was initially conducted. The Prussian military theorist 
Carl von Clausewitz, in his treatise On War, continually 
reminds us of the uncertainties of war, stating in one 
memorable passage:
War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the 
factors on which action in war is based are wrapped 
in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive 
and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled 
intelligence to scent out the truth.16 
Understood in Clausewitzian terms, scenario planning in 
MINDEF sought to lift the temporal “fog of war”: develop-
ing net assessments of the current state and future trajec-
tory of Singapore’s military capabilities in relation to 
other countries, identifying and analysing “the enemy’s” 
likely courses of actions, and anticipating political, socio-
economic and technological shocks that could alter the 
military and geopolitical status quo. 
Singapore’s pioneering attempts at strategic foresight 
consisted mainly in the application of tools and 
techniques that allowed the foresight practitioner to 
“see a thing” ahead of his rivals and competitors, be it 
a nascent social trend, a developing political pattern, an 
economic point of inflexion, or an emerging technolo-
gy. This epistemological approach can best be described 
as positivist, which assumes, in the main, that through 
the use of scientific methods and the application of 
rational analysis, it is possible to discover the “truth” 
of things.17 For all the sophistication of other foresight 
tools that were subsequently adopted—the Risk Assess-
ment Horizon Scanning (RAHS) programme under the 
National Security Coordination Secretariat, the tools 
centred on the Cynefin framework18—to supplement 
scenario planning, strategic foresight remains largely 
informed by a positivist worldview. Needless to say, there 
remains a natural fit between a positivist epistemology—
manifested most clearly in the application of tools—and 
aspects of the future that are deemed to be ontologically 
objectively “real” (such as geopolitical risks and military 
threats), out there waiting to be uncovered.
Despite the many limitations of the positivist worldview 
—the chief of which being the privileging of the scien-
tific, rational method above all else to get at “the truth” 
—the fact is that a positivist epistemology, along with the 
many tools and techniques that go with it, remains very 
useful... to a point. That point occurs when objective risks 
which can be assessed and mitigated give way to aspira-
tions that are subjectively and dynamically articulated. 
The process of producing the 1997 National Scenarios 
had given some hint of the growing salience of the more 
ephemeral, abstract and subjective socio-political and 
cultural issues, which were confirmed in the subsequent 
iterations of the scenarios.
The growing importance of aspirations, identities, values 
and reinterpretations of charter myths in charting Singa-
pore’s possible futures necessitated an expansion of the 
epistemological toolkit to incorporate post-positivist 
perspectives. The setting up of the Centre for Strategic 
Futures (CSF)19 within the SPO in 2009, whose mandate 
of challenging the dogmas, orthodoxies and “groupthink” 
that might have permeated the foresight establishment 
through the use of eclectic and experimental approaches, 
was endorsed at the highest levels. It was, above all, an 
acknowledgement that, to borrow from De Jouvenel:
[The] future is a realm of freedom, of power and of 
will. It is at once a land to be explored, hence the 
utility of vigilance and anticipation,... and a land 
future of the social sector
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to be built on, hence the utility of the approach to 
prospective sometimes described as “normative”, 
which refers to the investigation not of possible 
futures but of desirable futures...20
The notion that strategic foresight, and public policy 
more broadly, would have to take into account the aspira-
tions, interests, hopes and fears of Singaporeans has 
manifested itself most resoundingly in the OSC.
Of course, history will ultimately judge the usefulness and 
ultimate impact of the OSC. Nevertheless, the OSC has 
been an intriguing and welcome evolution of Singapore’s 
strategic foresight enterprise for three reasons. First, the 
OSC concept is driven by the idea of “co-creation,” of a 
partnership between those who govern and those who are 
governed. Strategic foresight, in this instance, becomes 
very much more of a collective enterprise, and less so the 
elite-driven phenomenon it typically is. Second, insofar 
as it is a dialogue, an often messy and dynamic process 
of articulations, negotiations, compromises, persuasions 
and concessions, it suggests that the strategic foresight 
enterprise may be valued more as a process, rather than 
the outcomes that it generates. Indeed, the OSC was 
deliberately unstructured “with no specific preset topics 
or areas for discussion...to provide as much open space 
as possible for Singaporeans to voice their opinions.”21 
Compared to previous dialogues such as 1991’s “The 
Next Lap,” 1999’s “Singapore 21,” and 2002’s “Remaking 
Singapore,” the OSC is novel in how the power to set the 
agenda lay almost exclusively with the participants.
Finally, and most importantly, the very term “conversa-
tion” is extremely apt and highly instructive: it suggests 
the power of speech acts, of “talking” the future 
into existence. Furthermore, as the conversation has 
unfolded, the shift in focus from threats to aspirations 
has been so stark as to bring a new vocabulary built on 
terms like “narrative,” “myth,” “values” and “identity” to 
the forefront of Singapore’s public consciousness.22 The 
ability to understand and engage with this new vocabu-
lary of strategic foresight lies beyond traditional positiv-
ist foresight tools; rather, it is through the eclectic suite 
of post-positivist, phenomenological approaches, such 
as the Causal Layered Analysis methodology,23 that are 
part of the CSF’s toolkit that this new inter-subjectively 
constituted vocabulary can be apprehended and made 
sense of.
conclusion
The past, present, and the future are inextricably 
intertwined. The past continues to cast its shadow on 
an ephemeral present. Furthermore, far from being 
immutable, the ever-present past is subject to constant 
revisions and reinterpretations; the past, in a sense, 
can be changed. Similarly, our present assumptions and 
images of the future shape our current actions, which in 
turn produce the future “present.”
Singapore in the early 21st century finds itself buffeted 
by dramatic and escalating changes, whether they are 
framed in terms of Alvin Toffler’s “Third Wave,” Karl 
Polanyi’s “Great Transformation,” Manuel Castell’s 
“Network Society,” Francis Fukuyama’s “Great Disrup-
tion,” or Douglas Rushkoff ’s “Present Shock.” Amidst 
these complexities and accelerations, the strategic 
foresight enterprise becomes ever more salient, even 
if increasingly difficult. We are acting in a continually 
shifting and extended present into which the future is 
assimilated.
Furthermore, the growing importance of aspirations 
and the new modality of co-creating desirable futures 
by both the state and society jointly suggest that Singa-
pore’s foresight policies, far from being the straightfor-
ward application of tools and techniques, will have to be 
guided by the Aristotelian trinity of logos (the “how” of 
things), ethos (the questions of values and ethics), and 
pathos (how well we identify with each other). After all, 
what is strategic foresight but an attempt to articulate 
and attain “the good life”?
Clearly, the future ain’t what it used to be.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not 
necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, the 
Centre for Strategic Futures.
“furthermore, as the conversation has 
unfolded, the shift in focus from threats  
to aspirations has been so stark as to 
bring a neW vocabulary built on terms like 
'narrative','myth', 'values' and 'identity' to  
the forefront of singapore’s public 
consciousness."22
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